Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 40 | Number 2

Article 2

1-1-2000

Fashioning a Coherent Demand Rule for
Derivative Litigation in California
Jeffrey S. Facter

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey S. Facter, Fashioning a Coherent Demand Rule for Derivative Litigation in California, 40 Santa Clara L. Rev. 379 (2000).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol40/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

FASHIONING A COHERENT DEMAND RULE FOR
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION IN CALIFORNIA
Jeffrey S. Facter*
This article examines the following question: What test
should California adopt to determine whether allegations
made pursuant to California Corporations Code section
800(b)(2) by a shareholder seeking to initiate derivative litigation on behalf of a California corporation excuse that
shareholder from first making a demand on the board of directors to bring that litigation on behalf of the corporation?
This issue is arising with increasing frequency, but California
courts lack specific standards for deciding when the demand
requirement should be excused in derivative cases involving
California corporations.
This article argues that California should adopt its own,
clearly defined demand rule, rather than simply adopt Delaware law as many California trial courts have done. Delaware's demand futility rule is costly to apply and counterproductive. This article proposes instead that the California
courts adopt a "universal demand" rule, as supported by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the American Law Institute
("ALI"), and the American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model
Rules. Alternatively, this article argues that if California
opts to follow Delaware law, the California appellate courts
should at least modify the Delaware rule to make it more
simple and cost-efficient to apply. In particular, the article
proposes that the Delaware rule, if adopted as California law,
be modified to eliminate (1) the exception that allows allegations that a majority of the board committed a breach of the
* Partner, Shearman & Sterling, San Francisco. J.D., Harvard Law
School; B.A., Grinnell College. The author specializes in securities class action
litigation and derivative litigation concerning corporate governance issues. The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the editors of the Santa Clara
Law Review and of I-Wei Wang in preparing this article for publication.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

duty of care to excuse demand; and (2) the "reasonable doubt"
standard embedded in Delaware's demand futility test. Finally, in the event that California ultimately chooses to adopt
Delaware's demand rule without modification, the California
courts should clearly embrace two other integral aspects of
the Delaware rule: (1) the requirement that allegations of
demand futility be pleaded with particularity; and (2) Delaware law's distinction between allegations of simple negligence, which do not excuse demand in Delaware, and allegations of gross negligence, which do excuse demand.
I. THE GROWING NEED FOR THE CALIFORNIA COURTS
TO ARTICULATE A SPECIFIC TEST FOR EXCUSING DEMAND

A.

The Recurrence of the Legal Issue and the Lack of
Governing Precedent with Which to Resolve It
The question addressed by this article is important, in
part because the issue is now arising, and is likely to continue
to arise, with considerable frequency considering the increasing number of derivative cases being filed in the California courts.'
The increase in derivative litigation is a
by-product of the enactment by the United States Congress of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("Reform
Act").2 After holding hearings in 1995, Congress found "significant evidence of abuse in private securities lawsuits," including:
(1) the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and others whenever there is a significant change in
an issuer's stock price, without regard to any underlying
culpability of the issuer, and with only faint hope that the
discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible
cause of action ... (3) the abuse of the discovery process to
impose costs so burdensome that it is often economical for
the victimized party to settle.3
1. See, e.g., Stuart J. Baskin, Recent Development in State Securities, Derivative and CorporateLaw, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1996, at 449, 451 (PLI

Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 958, 1996) ("[Olne can
already observe a discernible shift in securities and corporate governance actions to state court forums, especially in California.").
2. Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1998)).
3. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE,

H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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To eliminate the abusive practices encountered in federal
securities class action litigation, Congress passed the Reform
Act to provide defendants with procedural and substantive
protections against abusive litigation and the enormous costs
it imposes.4 However, the Reform Act has not stopped plaintiffs' attorneys from filing cases against corporations, and
their officers and directors, whenever the stock price of a
publicly-traded company declines sharply. Instead, to circumvent the protections conferred upon defendants in federal
cases by the Reform Act, many plaintiffs' attorneys file those
cases in state court. Specifically, California plaintiffs' attorneys bring litigation in state court by employing two vehicles
available under California law: (1) securities fraud class actions brought under California Corporations Code sections
25400 and 25500, alleging that officers and directors misrepresented the corporation's performance and prospects;5 and
(2) derivative litigation, alleging that unlawful mismanagement by the officers and directors resulted in a drop in the
stock price. In many cases, plaintiffs' attorneys employ both
vehicles to avoid the protections of the Reform Act.
The California Supreme Court recognized the need for
early appellate review to establish threshold legal rules governing securities fraud cases in California courts. The Court
recently granted interlocutory review to address the issue of
who may sue under sections 25400 and 25500 in securities
fraud class actions. 6
It is equally important that California's appellate courts
address the other category of cases now being filed in the
state courts as a result of the Reform Act: derivative litigation. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that the influx of
litigation from the federal courts into California courts will,
679, 730.
4. See id.
5. See, e.g., Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d
539, 544 n.10 (Cal. 1999) (citing statistics regarding migration of claims to California state courts); see also Julia C. Kou, Note, Closing the Loophole in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 253, 256-57
(1998); Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism:Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 274, 302 (1998).
6. See Diamond Multimedia Sys., 968 P.2d at 543, 557 (holding persons
who bought securities outside California may bring suit under Corporations
Code sections 25400 and 25500); see also StorMedia, Inc. v. Superior Court, 976
P.2d 214, 222 (Cal. 1999) (holding that offering stock in employee stock purchase plan renders company a "seller" under sections 25400 and 25500).
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in the future, be largely comprised of derivative-as opposed
to securities class action-litigation. Due to Congress's recent
passage of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998,' which preempts most state securities class actions by
prohibiting cases involving more than fifty plaintiffs from
being brought under state law, securities class action suits in
California will decrease.8 Thus, if a plaintiff-shareholder
wishes to avoid the Reform Act by filing a lawsuit in state
court, he or she is most likely to file a derivative action.
The first question trial courts must decide in derivative
litigation cases is whether the plaintiff-shareholder made a
pre-suit demand of the corporation's board of directors to pursue the litigation. If the plaintiff-shareholder failed to make
the demand, the case must be dismissed unless demand is excused. While the courts of this state are thus asked with
greater frequency to decide whether demand on a company's
board should be excused, there is virtually no California law
to aid courts in resolving this fundamental issue of corporate
governance.9 There is only one modern case, Shields v. Sin-

7. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a-n).
8. See id. at 3228 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b), (f)(2)).
9. One explanation for the dearth of appellate law on the issue of when, if
ever, demand will be excused is that the issue is one that inherently evades ordinary appellate review. Because the demand requirement set forth in Corporations Code section 800(b)(2) is a rule of pleading, meaningful judicial review of
an order overruling a demurrer on the ground of demand futility can occur only
at the pleading stage of a case, before there is a final, appealable judgment. Indeed, the issue raised by a demurrer challenging a plaintiffs failure to make a
demand-that is, the question whether the board should have an opportunity to
evaluate the claims before a shareholder pursues the litigation-is moot long
before the time final judgment is entered. Once the trial court overrules the
demurrer and excuses demand, the individual shareholder may proceed to litigate on behalf of the corporation. That litigation often lasts for years before
judgment is entered, or the case is settled. On the other hand, if the demurrer
is sustained, there is an appealable order, but the plaintiff rarely has the incentive to take an appeal because the option of proceeding to make a demand on
the board is a much lower cost alternative than prosecuting an appeal. Accordingly, unless an appellate court, upon a petition for a writ of mandate,
grants discretionary review of an order overruling a demurrer, it is unlikely
that an opportunity will arise for the courts to define the standards in California for applying the demand rule. The appellate courts should grant such extraordinary review when the occasion arises. As one of this country's most important commercial centers, California can no longer afford to have key
corporate governance issues resolved by lower courts' application of the law of
other states on an ad hoc basis.
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gleton,'° that comments on when demand may be excused in
California." The Shields case suggests that demand may be
excused when a board is not "capable of fairly evaluating" a
demand. Shields fails to set forth a test to determine whether
a board will be deemed incapable of conducting such an
evaluation." Thus, California law provides little or no guidance on the standard for excusing demand. 3
Given the dearth of California case law, the California
trial courts frequently look to Delaware law and apply their
own interpretation of Delaware case law, even though no
California precedent indicates that such borrowing is appro10. Shields v. Singleton, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459 (Ct. App. 1993).
11. The only other California cases that comment on the issue are more
than forty years old and involve closely held corporations. See, e.g., Reed v.
Norman, 314 P.2d 204 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Koshaba v. Koshaba, 132 P.2d 854
(Cal. Ct. App. 1942). In Reed, the court noted that "[c]ertainly, no demand is
necessary when conspiracy, fraud or criminal conduct of the defendants is
charged." Reed, 314 P.2d at 208 (citing Gottesfeld v. Richmaid Ice Cream Co.,
252 P.2d 973 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953)). That court ultimately found demand to be
futile based on the plaintiffs factual allegations that the president and acting
director of the corporation committed "high crimes and misdemeanors ... to the
detriment of the corporation" and had "the sole voice in dominating the policy or
any particular act of the corporation." Id. at 208-09. In Koshaba, the court
held that demand would have been futile where the plaintiff alleged that the
president and managing director of the corporation "was guilty of various
fraudulent and dishonest acts" and that he exercised "domination and control"
over the other directors, such that the other directors "exercise[d] no functions
whatsoever in the conduct of the business of [the] corporation as such directors
except to carry out [the president/managing director's] bidding and directions."
Koshaba, 132 P.2d at 858.
12. See Shields, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 466. The Shields court noted that the
holding in the earlier California cases that "no demand is necessary when conspiracy, fraud or criminal conduct of the defendants is charged" is "surely a
sound principle." Id. at 465. The court also observed that the complaint at issue did not allege any facts that would indicate that the directors had participated in any criminal or fraudulent activities, nor that the directors "benefited
directly from the wrongdoing or were otherwise disabled from exercising independent business judgment." Id. (emphasis added). Ultimately, the court concluded that the complaint provided only "broad, conclusory allegations" against
all of the defendant directors and that such "bare allegations of director wrongdoing without factual support" are insufficient in any event to excuse demand.
Id. at 465-66 (citing Findley v. Garrett, 240 P.2d 421, 425-27 (Cal. Ct. App.
1952)).
13. Piecing together the fragmentary comments from Koshaba, Reed, and
Shields, one might summarize California law as follows: demand will be excused as futile only when a plaintiff alleges particularized facts showing that a
majority of the directors of a board (1) engaged in fraudulent or criminal conduct, (2) had some self-interest in or derived some direct benefit from the challenged transaction, or (3) lacked independence to evaluate the demand because
of domination and control by some other person or persons.
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priate. There has been no critical examination by those lower
courts to evaluate whether California should apply Delaware
law. Further, some trial courts have misapplied Delaware
law. 14
B.

The Importance of the Demand Rule as a Policy Matter

Whatever demand rule is adopted in California will reduce the number of shareholder derivative actions litigated in
the California courts, and therefore substantially affect the
California court system's workload.1 The demand requirement forces a shareholder to seek an "intracorporate resolution" of that shareholder's claim before pursuing litigation on
behalf of the corporation. 6 As such, it provides a mechanism
for a corporation to resolve shareholder claims without the
need for judicial intervention. The demand requirement can
fulfill that objective only if the courts establish a clearly defined standard that narrowly limits the circumstances under
which demand will be excused.
Moreover, judicial definition of specific standards governing when to excuse demand will affect not only the quantity, but also the quality of the litigation pursued in California courts. The goal of the Reform Act was, in part, to screen
non-meritorious cases out of the federal courts, largely at the
pleading stage. Because the Reform Act is applicable only in
the federal courts, plaintiffs are more likely to file in state
court the cases that could not survive the more rigorous
threshold scrutiny required by the Reform Act. As a result, a
large component of the cases filed in California courts in response to the Reform Act involve the non-meritorious cases
that were the target of the Reform Act.
Derivative litigation has historically been notorious as a

14. See infra Part IV.B.
15. In addition, clarification of California's demand rule will have a significant effect on federal courts adjudicating derivative actions brought on behalf of

California corporations. To the extent that derivative actions against California
corporations continue to be brought in federal courts, California law will control
the demand rule analysis in those cases. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500
U.S. 90, 108-09 (1991).
16. See Shields, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463.
17. See, e.g., JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE, H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995

U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 740.
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vehicle for bringing strike suits." One purpose of the demand
requirement is to enable a corporation's board of directorsbefore litigation arises-to separate the non-meritorious shareBy performing this
holder claims from the meritorious.
"gatekeeper" function, the demand rule empowers a board of
directors to protect the corporation from the heavy cost of
strike suits, which, by definition, seek to drive up a corporation's costs for the sole purpose of extracting a settlement.
The demand requirement can be an effective gatekeeper
against strike suits only if the exceptions to the rule are
clearly defined and narrowly drawn. The current California
law is simply too unclear and underdeveloped to effectuate
the purposes of the demand rule.
The standards set by California courts for excusing demand will also impact corporate governance, both from the
perspective of California corporations' boards of directors and
their shareholders. The fundamental rule of corporate governance in California, as elsewhere, is that the board of directors, not individual shareholders, manages the business of the
corporation. 0 The decision whether to pursue litigation on
behalf of a corporation is part of the business of the corporation." The demand rule is designed to enforce this scheme of
corporate governance by requiring a shareholder to bring any
claim brought on the corporation's behalf to the board for
evaluation before initiating litigation. To leave the exceptions
to the demand rule undefined-as California does-or to define them vaguely and expansively, undermines the structure
of corporate governance established by Corporations Code

18. See, e.g., Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d
Cir. 1978) (recognizing that derivative actions may be brought not to remedy
wrongs to the corporation, but "to induce settlements beneficial to the named
plaintiff or his counsel"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979). A strike suit is a
"[sihareholder derivative action begun with hope of winning large attorney fees
or private settlements, and with no intention of benefiting corporation on behalf
of which the suit is theoretically brought." Black's Law Dictionary 1423 (6th ed.
1990).
19. See Barr v. Wackman, 329 N.E.2d 180, 186 (N.Y. 1975) ("It is clear then
that the demand [requirement] is generally designed to weed out unnecessary
or illegitimate shareholder derivative suits."); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984).
20. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 1990).
21. See Findley v. Garrett, 240 P.2d 421, 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) ("Directors have the same discretion with respect to the prosecution of claims on behalf
of the corporation as they have in other business matters.").
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section 300(a).22 Undefined or vaguely defined exceptions to
the demand rule permit individual shareholders to deprive
boards of directors of their authority and right under that
statute to manage the affairs of their corporations.
The demand rule and the courts' enforcement of it will
also affect corporate governance from the standpoint of the
shareholders. The corporate governance structure reflected
in the corporations law is modeled on our political system: a
representative democracy. A majority of shareholders elects
the board of directors to manage the affairs of the corporation. 2 Permitting a single shareholder to wrest control of a
corporation's litigation away from the board of directors,
which was elected by a majority of the shareholders, disenfranchises the shareholder majority. Leaving the exceptions
to the demand requirement undefined, or defining the exceptions too broadly, gives a single shareholder the latitude to
nullify the rights of the majority shareholders.
The importance of the legal issues presented in this article is underscored by the fact that the supreme courts of three
major commercial states-Delaware, New York, and most recently, Pennsylvania-have all addressed the issue. These
three courts promulgated very specific (and different) tests for
excusing demand.24 The following discussion of those tests
illustrates the important policy considerations underlying
this issue.
II. THE DELAWARE DEMAND FUTILITY RULE AND WHY
CALIFORNIA SHOULD NOT ADOPT IT

Because of Delaware's prominence as a commercial jurisdiction, other jurisdictions frequently borrow its decisional
law regarding issues of corporate law.25 However, Delaware's
22. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (providing that "the business and affairs of
the corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers shall be exercised by
or under the direction of the board.").
23. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 301 (West 1990) (annual election of directors); cf
id. § 303(a) (removal of directors without cause by simple majority).

24. See infra Part II.B (discussing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del.
1984), Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 213 (Del. 1991), and their progeny); Part
IV.A. (discussing Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 1996)); Part III (discussing Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042 (Pa. 1997)).
25. See John C. Coffee, Jr., New Myths and Old Realities: The American

Law Institute Faces the Derivative Action, 48 BUs. LAW. 1407, 1432 (1993)
("Without doubt, Delaware corporation law has long been followed-sometimes
almost reflexively-by other American jurisdictions.").
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legal test for determining when pleadings are sufficient to excuse the demand requirement is at odds with the purposes
and objectives of California's demand rule. California courts
should resist the urge to adopt Delaware law by default.
A.

The Function of and Policies Underlying the Demand
Requirement

In a derivative action, a shareholder seeks to assert, on
behalf of a corporation, causes of action that belong to the
corporation. The law does not, however, permit any shareholder to take charge of a corporation's litigation whenever he
or she pleases. Under California law, the right to conduct
litigation on behalf of a corporation resides in that corporation's elected board of directors, not in a dissident shareholder.26 Accordingly, California law requires that a shareholder, in order to proceed with a derivative action, first
tender a demand to the board to have the corporation pursue
the litigation. 27 The demand requirement thus implements
the basic rule of corporate governance set forth in California
Corporations Code section 300(a)-that the board, not the
shareholders, holds the power to manage the affairs of a corporation, including its litigation. 28
Courts recognize that the demand requirement is not
merely a "technical pleading hurdle," but rather based on the
"fundamental tenet of American corporate law that places the
responsibility for making decisions in the hands of the board
of directors" rather than on individual shareholders.2 9 As the
Shields court, in California's only modern case regarding presuit demand, explained:
The purpose of [the requirement] is to encourage intracorporate resolution of disputes and to protect the managerial freedom of those to whom the responsibility of running the business is delegated. This policy is merely an
extension of the business judgment rule, which dictates
that judicial interference with corporate decision-making

26. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a).
27. See id. § 800(b)(2) (shareholder must plead that demand has been made
or the reasons for not having made demand); see also Shields v. Singleton, 19
Cal. Rptr. 2d 459, 462 (Ct. App. 1993).
28. See Shields, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462.
29. Johnson v. Hui, 752 F. Supp. 909, 911 (N.D. Cal. 1990); accord Aronson,
473 A.2d at 811-12.
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should be limited.3 °
Thus, the demand requirement gives the board an opportunity, before a shareholder proceeds with litigation on a corporation's behalf, to exercise its business judgment as to
whether that litigation is in the best interest of the corporation.3 1
California law should reject any proposed exception to
the demand requirement that would undermine those policy
objectives. For example, since a significant objective of the
demand requirement is to assure that the board, not individual shareholders, manages the litigation of the corporation,
California should not incorporate exceptions to the demand
requirement that make it too easy for individual shareholders
to wrest control of the litigation from the board. Similarly,
since an important purpose of the demand requirement is to
create an early opportunity for intracorporate resolution of
shareholder claims so as to avoid costly litigation, California
law should reject exceptions nullifying that intended benefit.
Any test that routinely embroils a corporation in protracted,
costly litigation just to determine whether a shareholder
must first pursue an intracorporate resolution defeats the
purpose of the demand rule. As shown in Part II.B, Delaware
law is antithetical to the purposes of the demand requirement
because it involves the courts and parties in complex, difficult, and costly threshold litigation regarding excusing demand.
B.

InconsistenciesBetween DelawareLaw and the Objectives
of the Demand Requirement
1.

The Aronson Test and Its UnderlyingRationale
The Delaware test for excusing demand is based on the
assumption that in some circumstances making a demand
would be futile. In Aronson v. Lewis,32 the Delaware Supreme
Court articulated the test for ascertaining the presence of
such circumstances. Demand would be futile when "under
the particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created
30. Shields, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463 (quoting 1A BALLANTINE & STERLING,
CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS § 292.03, at 14-19 (R. Bradbury Clark ed., 4th

ed. 1992)).
31. See Findley v. Garrett, 240 P.2d 421, 426 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
32. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 805.
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that: (1) the directors are disinterested and independent and
(2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a
valid exercise of business judgment.' 3
Delaware's futility exception to the demand rule relies on
the premise that where a complaint shows that a majority of
directors have reason to fear being held personally liable in a
derivative lawsuit, it would be futile for a shareholder to ask
those directors to pursue the lawsuit." A shareholder cannot,
however, establish such fear of personal liability merely by
pleading that the directors approved the transaction being
challenged or that the directors have been named as defendants in the lawsuit. To permit demand to be excused so
easily would nullify the demand requirement."
Instead, Delaware law excuses demand only where the
complaint shows that directors would have a realistic-as opposed to a theoretical-fear of liability for having approved
the transaction.36 In effect, the Delaware approach is to make
the demand requirement turn on an educated guess as to the
likelihood of director liability made by the trial court at the
outset of a case. That educated guess is based on the pleadings alone, not on any evidence. If the complaint suggests a
reasonable ground for a finding of director liability, then
Delaware deems it a waste of time to ask the directors to decide whether the corporation should take action on the shareholder claim.
In most cases, directors need not fear liability for approving corporate transactions because the law furnishes
them with a powerful defense: the business judgment rule.
The business judgment rule recognizes that courts are
ill-equipped to evaluate the wisdom of business decisions
made by directors, and, as a result, the judiciary should not
second-guess those decisions." Thus, the business judgment
rule renders directors immune from liability-even for stupid
or careless business decisions-so long as the directors made
33. Id. at 814.
34. See, e.g., id.
35. See id. at 814, 817-18; see also Shields, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465 (rejecting
the claim that demand was futile simply because "all board members were
named as defendants in this suit").
36. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 818.
37. See Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 49 (Del. 1997); Gaillard v.
Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 710 (Ct. App. 1989); Eldridge v. Tymshare,
Inc., 230 Cal. Rptr. 815, 820 (Ct. App. 1986).
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the decisions in good faith, and after a good faith effort to inform themselves of the facts. 38 Accordingly, Delaware courts
decide whether directors have reason to fear personal liability, and thus whether to excuse demand, based on the court's
best guess as to whether the business judgment rule will be
applicable at trial.39
Since there are two ways for a director to lose the protection of the business judgment rule-by breaching either the
duty of loyalty or the duty of care-the Aronson test has two
alternative prongs. Under the first prong of Aronson, a plaintiff may demonstrate demand futility by alleging particularized facts that create a reasonable doubt that the directors
are disinterested and independent." Allegations of this type
suggest that the board breached its duty of loyalty. Alternatively, under the second prong, a plaintiff must allege particularized facts that create a reasonable doubt that the
challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid
exercise of business judgment.4 ' Satisfying this prong requires particularized allegations of a breach of the duty of
care." To satisfy the second prong by means of allegations of
inadequate procedural due care, a plaintiff must plead facts
alleging gross negligence, rather than simple negligence.
In Levine v. Smith,44 the Delaware Supreme Court articulated the Aronson test somewhat differently:
The trial court is confronted with two related but distinct
questions: (1) whether threshold presumptions of director
disinterest or independence are rebutted by well-pleaded
facts; and, if not, (2) whether the complaint pleads particularized facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt
that the challenged transaction was the product of a valid
exercise of business judgment.40
This later formulation suggests that the "reasonable doubt"
38. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
1996).
39. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814-15.
40. See id. at 814.
41. See id.
42. See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988). Notably, no published California decision states that demand may be excused based on allegations of a breach of the duty of care. See also supra note 13 (discussing the rules
from Koshaba,Reed, and Shields).
43. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
44. Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194 (Del. 1991).
45. Id. at 205.
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standard applies only to the second prong of the Aronson test.
2. The Flaws of the Aronson Rule as a Test for Whether
Demand is Required
The Delaware test has been criticized,4 6 and should not be
adopted in California, for at least four reasons. First, the
collateral litigation engendered by the Aronson test makes it
costly and inefficient to administer. Second, the Aronson test
forces the trial court to make an uninformed prediction, based
only on the pleadings, as to how the merits of the case might
fare. Third, the potentially expansive second prong of the Aronson test opens the door for individual shareholders to eviscerate section 300(a). Finally, the "reasonable doubt" standard embedded in the Aronson test is confusing, inconsistent
with the objectives of the demand rule, and injects an excessive degree of subjectivity into the court's determination of
whether demand should be excused.
a. Cost and Inefficiency
The Aronson test and its rationale are exceedingly complicated, and those complexities generate substantial
amounts of unnecessary litigation.47 Applying the Aronson
46. See Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank, 870 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1989); Coffee,
supra note 25, at 1413 ("[Tlhe Aronson test ultimately is an empty one that seldom dictates the result in a specific case."); Glenn G. Morris, Shareholder Derivative Suits: Louisiana Law, 56 LA. L. REV. 583, 613 (1996) ("[Tjhe Aronson
court introduced a considerable degree of unnecessary technical complexity into
the law, for which the court has received some well-reasoned criticism.") (citing
Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 509-12 (Del. Ch. 1984), affd, 499 A.2d 1186
(Del. 1985)); Carol B. Swanson, Juggling ShareholderRights and Strike Suits in
Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1353
(1993) ("Commentators have almost universally criticized the judicial confusion
surrounding the various applications of the futility exception."). Professor Coffee argues that the "universal demand rule" promulgated in the ALI's Principles
of Corporate Governance is far preferable to the Delaware rule. Professor
Swanson's article, as suggested by its title, criticizes certain aspects of the universal demand rule on policy grounds. However, as discussed below in Part III,
even the ALI's critics, including Professor Swanson, appear unanimously to endorse the modern trend towards some form of universal demand. See infra note
68 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 25 at 1414 ("Delaware's demand
rule ... results in a substantial amount of collateral litigation and sometimes
can be a trap for the unwary."); see also 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 7.03 (1992) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] ("The Delaware law on demand and
its excuse seems in particular to invite collateral litigation.").
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test, and particularly its second prong, necessarily collapses
litigation about the threshold issue of whether a demand on
the board is required into litigation about the merits of the
case. For example, to determine whether to excuse demand
under the second prong of Aronson, a court must assess the
sufficiency of the cause of action alleging a breach of the duty
of care.48 This undertaking requires a court (1) to examine
the substantial case law defining breach of the duty of care,
and (2) to decide whether the factual allegations suggest that
the board committed gross negligence or merely simple negligence.49 Not surprisingly, particularly given the liberal standard for granting leave to amend, such litigation can cost a
corporation and its shareholders hundreds of thousands of
dollars.'0
The purpose of the demand requirement, however, is to
eliminate strike suits and avoid litigation where non-judicial
resolution is possible, not to engender collateral litigation regarding this threshold issue.5 The objective of the demand
requirement is to afford the board of directors an opportunity
to exercise its authority and responsibility under section
300(a), not to subject the corporation to the costs of further
litigation when the board believes in good faith that the litigation would not be in the best interests of the shareholders.
That objective is defeated by a rule that forces a corporation
to spend perhaps hundreds of thousands of dollars just to obtain the opportunity to make that determination. In addition,
the demand rule in California is intended to provide an opportunity for "intracorporate resolution" of claims so that they
may be resolved outside the courtroom, before substantial
litigation costs are incurred.5 2 A rule that imposes a substan48. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
50. The author has been involved in cases in the California Superior Courts
in which litigation about demand futility alone has lasted two years.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19 and 26-31.
52. See Shields v. Singleton, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459, 463 (Ct. App. 1993). As
one commentator summarized:
The reason for the demand requirement is that directors, not
shareholders, are supposed to make major corporate decisions. Another purpose of demand is to give corporate management a chance to take corrective measures or persuade

the wrongdoers to make right. Judicial economy is achieved
by ending the need for a lawsuit. Likewise, the board may
accept the demand, bring suit against the wrongdoer, and try
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tial litigation cost on corporations and their shareholders before attempting an "intracorporate resolution" eliminates this
opportunity.5 3
b. Courts' Inability to Predict the Cases in Which
Demand Would Make PracticalSense
The Aronson rule for demand futility is irrational because
it makes the demand requirement turn on the court's uninformed prediction of how the case will turn out on the merits,
rather than on whether the purposes of the demand rule
could be achieved in a particular case. As the ALI stated,
"the demand rule, if used as a rule of substantive law, inherently asks the court to make a premature prediction both
about the basic merits of the action at the outset, before discovery has occurred, and about the board's objectivity." 4
The Delaware approach of excusing demand based on
what is at most a preliminary hypothetical guess as to
whether directors would prevail on a business judgment rule
defense makes little sense for at least two reasons. First, the
guess is entirely uninformed: it is based purely on what is alleged in the pleadings, not on any facts. Thus, much of the
time, the court's guess will be wrong. Each time the court's

to persuade the shareholder to step aside. The board might
be concerned that, if allowed to bring suit, the shareholder
might settle for an inadequate amount from the wrongdoers.
Conversely, the board may find the lawsuit to be unmeritorious and reject the demand-perhaps aware that the suit's legal fees would be more costly than the possible recovery from
the defendants.
Thomas P. Kinney, Stockholder Derivative Suits: Demand and Futility Where
the Board Fails to Stop Wrongdoers, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 172, 176 (1994) (citations
omitted).
53. The demand rule, in encouraging the "intracorporate resolution" of
claims, is comparable in function to any court rule that requires early submission of claims to mediation. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.10-.11
(West 1982 & Supp. 1999) (governing referral of cases involving an amount in
controversy of less than $50,000 to mandatory judicial arbitration). No court
would adopt a rule that forces a party seeking to enforce its right to mediation
to litigate for years at enormous expense just to determine whether mediation
should at least be tried. See id. § 1141.11(a) (making non-appealable the trial
court's determination that the amount in controversy in a case meets the relevant maximum for referral to arbitration).
54. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, § 7.03 cmt. d, at 56; see also Starrels v.
First Nat'l Bank, 870 F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (criticizing Aronson test because "it requires courts to adjudicate the
merits on the pleadings").
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uninformed guess is contrary to the facts, enforcement of the
demand requirement would have served its intended purpose.
There is perhaps no other place in the law where statutory
rights-both the board's right to manage the corporation's
litigation and the majority shareholders' rights to have the
corporation's affairs managed by their elected board members-can be divested prior to discovery and without any factual showing.
Second, why excuse demand simply because directors
may not have a business judgment rule defense to an alleged
claim? Since the purpose of the demand rule is to encourage
the pre-litigation, intracorporate resolution of shareholder
claims, the demand requirement can serve a useful function
both with respect to meritorious and non-meritorious claims.5 5
Indeed, the more meritorious a claim, the more beneficial it
may be to have the board evaluate it before the parties commit themselves to extended litigation."
The analysis might be different if making a pre-suit demand were particularly costly to a shareholder. Were that
the case, a court's prediction that a board might be predisposed not to pursue a derivative claim because of its merit
might provide some justification for excusing the shareholder
from incurring the cost of that pre-suit demand. But in
nearly all cases, requiring a demand imposes virtually no cost
on a shareholder." At most, the shareholder experiences a
minimal delay in filing the derivative claim while the board
investigates and decides on a course of action. If the board
does not adequately investigate and respond to the claim in
good faith, the shareholder may proceed with the derivative
lawsuit." The demand rule simply puts into play a require55. See, e.g., Kinney, supra note 52, at 176 (summarizing the actions a
board might undertake as to meritorious and non-meritorious claims).
56. See Starrels, 870 F.2d at 1174-75 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Many
derivative cases are settled without the payment of damages by the directors.
Instead, boards often agree to adopt certain procedural reforms or "therapeutic
measures" to prevent recurrences of the situation or actions alleged. See, e.g.,
In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 972 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(requiring demand even in a meritorious case alleging a breach of the duty of
care could facilitate the achievement of such a resolution at an early stage).
57. See, e.g., Swanson, supra note 46, at 1387 ("[Dlemand is undisputedly
easy to make."); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, § 7.03 cmt. e, at 57 (stating
that a demand is a "relatively costless step").
58. See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 213 (Del. 1991); see also Findley v.
Garrett, 240 P.2d 421, 426 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).

2000]

FASHIONING A DEMAND RULE

395

ment of exhausting "intracorporate" remedies that are
cost-free, both to the shareholder and to the courts. Since
that system will result in the early disposition of at least
some meritorious claims outside of court, why excuse demand
just because the pleading suggests that the claim may be
meritorious?
c. Eviscerationof Section 300(a)
The second prong of Aronson opens the door to excessive
usurpation by individual shareholders of the authority
granted to the board by Corporations Code section 300(a). Although the Delaware Supreme Court intended that it be difficult for a plaintiff to avoid the demand requirement based on
allegations of a breach of the duty of care,59 the amorphous
nature of the second prong of Aronson makes it relatively
easy for any plaintiff to avoid the demand requirement. This
vagueness arises because many courts view gross negligence
and simple negligence as merely two overlapping parts of a
spectrum, with no clear dividing point between the two.60 A
shareholder who, with the benefit of hindsight, can plead
enough facts to place his complaint in the "gray area" between simple and gross negligence has an outstanding opportunity to avoid the demand requirement. The Delaware Supreme Court exacerbated that problem by suggesting that the
demand futility issue under Aronson is a factual question, the
resolution of which may involve some discretion by the lower
court.6'
In short, unless California rejects the second prong of Aronson, in nearly every case where hindsight provides room to
second-guess the decision-making of the board in the under59. See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 190 (Del. 1988) (placing a "heavy
burden" on a plaintiff who attempts to avoid the demand requirement by alleging a lack of due care).
60. A leading torts treatise, after surveying numerous jurisdictions' attempts to define "gross negligence," notes that "most courts consider that 'gross
negligence'... differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind,"
and concludes that "[there is, in short, no generally accepted meaning." W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 21112 (5th ed. 1984); accord Pacific Bell v. Colich, 244 Cal. Rptr. 714, 722 (Ct. App.
1988) (same language); see also 46 CAL. JUR. 3D Negligence § 88 (Gene A. Noland et al. eds., 1978) (listing five distinct definitions of gross negligence used by
California courts and citing numerous cases representing each different formulation).
61. See e.g., Grobow, 539 A.2d at 186.
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lying transaction, the board risks being forced to cede control
of the corporation's litigation to minority shareholders.
d. The ReasonableDoubt Standard
The "reasonable doubt" standard in Aronson has been
criticized on several grounds. For example, the standard is
difficult to apply outside the criminal context (particularly at
the pleading stage). Further, reasonable doubt is inconsistent
with the demand rule's objective of granting the board, rather
than individual shareholders, the power to decide initially
whether the corporation should bring litigation.
Regarding the difficulty of applying the reasonable doubt
standard, Judge Easterbrook stated:
If "reasonable doubt" in the Aronson formula means the
same thing as "reasonable doubt" in criminal law, then
demand is excused whenever there is a [ten-percent]
chance that the original transaction is not protected by the
business judgment rule. Why should demand be excused
on such a slight showing? ...If "reasonable doubt" in cor-

porate law means something different from "reasonable
doubt" in criminal law, however, what is the difference?,62
[sic] and why use the same term for two different things?
The reasonable doubt test thus contradicts the rationale of
Aronson itself, in that it permits demand to be excused in
even those cases where, based on the pleadings, it is more
likely than not that the directors have a meritorious business
judgment rule defense. For example, even where a complaint
itself suggests a sixty-percent chance that the board exercised
business judgment and would prevail on such a defense, the
reasonable doubt standard would allow-or indeed requirethe court to excuse demand.
Others criticize the reasonable doubt test for injecting "a
substantial measure of subjective judicial discretion into the
decision whether to excuse demand., 63 The ALI notes that

this subjectivity permits wide variance in the application of
62. Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank, 870 F.2d 1168, 1175 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring).
63. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, § 7.03 cmt. d, at 57 & reporter's note 5,
at 67; see Coffee, supra note 25, at 1413 ("A strong judge can usually manipulate
a 'reasonable doubt' standard to reach the outcome that he or she desires."); see
also Swanson, supra note 46, at 1352 ("[Tlhe reasonable doubt test... invites a
certain amount of judicial subjectivity in determining futility [of demand].") (citations omitted).
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Delaware law to similar facts, and "may result in demand
being excused too 64frequently, thereby unduly diminishing the
role of the board."
At a minimum, the "reasonable doubt" standard connotes
to most judges that the plaintiff has a relatively minimal
pleading burden. Consequently, if California were to adopt
the "reasonable doubt" aspect of Delaware's demand rule, the
demand requirement is likely to be excused so often that the
demand rule would become virtually meaningless.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE ALI'ABA RULE AND WHY
CALIFORNIA SHOULD ADOPT IT

For many of the reasons described above, there is an increasing trend in the law to reject the Aronson rule in favor of
a bright line test that provides simplicity and excuses demand in fewer cases. In 1992, following fourteen years of deliberations, the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project adopted its Principles of Corporate Governance
("Principles"). Section 7.03 of the Principles provides that
demand on the board in derivative actions "should be excused
only if the plaintiff makes a specific showing that irreparable
injury to the corporation would otherwise result."65 Section
7.03 thereby simplifies the demand rule by deleting the futility exception and substituting a narrower "irreparable injury"
exception.6 The revised Model Business Corporations Act,
promulgated by the Business Law Section of the American
Bar Association, advocates a similar rule. 7
The ALI/ABA rule eliminates much of the threshold litigation, collateral to the merits of the action, that slows the
pace and increases the cost of derivative actions under the
Delaware approach. 6 The ALI/ABA rule achieves this result
64. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, § 7.03 cmt. d, at 57 & reporter's note 5,
at 67.
65. Id. § 7.03.
66. See id. § 7.03 cmt. e, at 57.
67. See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (3d ed. Supp. 1997) [hereinafter
MODEL ACT]. The ABA's model act would require a shareholder to wait for 90
days after serving a demand, before filing a derivative suit, unless (1) the demand is rejected earlier, or (2) "irreparable injury to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90-day period." Id. In light of the narrowness of this exception to the demand requirement, both the ABA and ALI
approaches have been referred to as a "universal demand" rule. See, e.g., Swanson, supra note 46, at 1353-54.
68. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, § 7.03 cmt. e, at 67; 2 MODEL ACT,
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first by concerning itself solely with the comparative costs of
requiring or excusing demand, and second by abandoning any
attempt to guess at the pleading stage, as required by Aronson, whether directors would ultimately have a valid business
supra note 67, § 7.42 cmt., at 7-335; accord, e.g., Coffee, supra note 25, at 1415;
see also Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs. Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 106 (1991) (acknowledging, in dicta, judicial economies associated with universal demand); Swanson, supra note 46, at 1354. The Supreme Court in Kamen ultimately decided
that any advantages to be gained by applying a universal demand rule to federal derivative actions were not sufficient to overcome the federal courts' obligation to incorporate analogous state law (in that case, Delaware law) into federal
common law unless inconsistent with the policies underlying the federal statute
being interpreted. See Kamen, 500 U.S. at 106-07. The Court based its opinion
in part on its conclusion that the costs to be saved by avoiding collateral litigation regarding demand would be "marginal[]," because a "universal-demand rule
will merely shift the focus of threshold litigation from the question whether demand is excused to the question whether the directors' decision to terminate the
suit is entitled to deference." Id. at 106. California courts need not be swayed
by this reasoning, for at least three reasons. First, the conclusion that the cost
savings would be "marginal" is erroneous. In nearly all derivative litigation in
California where the board has refused a demand, there are two major components of expensive motion practice: litigation on the pleadings about demand
futility and litigation challenging the board's subsequent substantive decision, if
any, not to pursue the lawsuit. The rule proposed here would, notwithstanding
the observation in Kamen, eliminate the first component and could thereby save
litigants hundreds of thousands of dollars per case. Moreover, in those cases
where the board heeds the shareholder demand and takes action satisfactory to
the shareholder, both components of the motion practice would be eliminated if
the rule proposed here were adopted. Second, shifting the focus of the litigation
to the issue of whether the board properly refused a demand has the distinct
advantage of enabling the litigation to be decided based on the facts, rather
than based on the guesswork now employed in Delaware demand futility litigation. Rather than speculating based upon the pleadings alone as to whether a
board would be capable of fairly evaluating a demand-as a court must do under Aronson-courts are called upon in the demand-refused stage to evaluate
the actual decision-making process used by the board in deciding to reject the
demand. The discovery necessary to develop those facts ought to be minimal.
See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) (stating that
because the business judgment rule applies to a board's decision to reject a demand, only discovery regarding the board's process in reaching the decision is
relevant); see also Carlton Invs. v. TLC Beatrice Int'l Holdings, Inc., No. Civ.
A 18950, 1997 WL 38130, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1997). Third, there is no reason that a California court adjudicating a case involving a California corporation need follow Kamen. The Kamen Court was bound to borrow from state law
unless it conflicted with the policies underlying the federal statute at issue. See
Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98. Because a Delaware corporation was involved, the
Court had to examine whether the policies underlying the federal statute, the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(a) (1998), should override
the presumption that Delaware law should be borrowed. See Kamen, 500 U.S.
at 98. California's courts face no such constraint because, far from there being a
presumption in favor of borrowing from Delaware law, no California case indicates that such borrowing would be proper.
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judgment rule defense. A primary rationale behind the
ALI/ABA rule is that it places little, if any, burden on the
plaintiff, because making demand on the board is a "relatively costless step."6 9 Since requiring a shareholder to postpone derivative litigation until the board can assess the claim
ordinarily imposes no cost on the shareholder or the company,
the ALI/ABA demand rule excuses demand only where a
complaint pleads that such a brief delay will cause irreparable injury. For example, if a proposed merger could be concluded while the board is evaluating a demand for an action
seeking to enjoin the merger, the demand may be excused
under the "irreparable injury" exception.
The ALI/ABA proposed rule is also based in part on the
view that the Delaware test is founded on a fallacy: that the
corporation is powerless to act on a demand when a majority
of its members participated in the alleged wrongdoing. In
fact, the board is not "powerless" in such a situation. Among
other possible options, the board can still delegate its authority to assess and manage the litigation to disinterested directors or can expand its size and delegate that function to a
"special litigation committee" composed of the newly appointed directors." Thus, "demand is still an appropriate
starting point" even when a majority of the board is accused
of wrongdoing. 1
In 1997, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explicitly
adopted the universal demand rule set forth in the ALI's
2 In doing
Principles."
so, the court noted, among other things,
69. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, § 7.03 cmt. e, at 57.
70. Use of special litigation committees in such situations has been approved under California law. See Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 770-71
(9th Cir. 1981); see also Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 782-83 (9th Cir.
1979); Will v. Engebretson & Co., 261 Cal. Rptr. 868, 872 (Ct. App. 1989).
71. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, § 7.03 cmt. e, at 57; accord 2 MODEL
ACT, supra note 67, § 7.42 cmt., at 7-335 ("[E]ven though no director may be independent, the demand will give the board of directors the opportunity to reexamine the act complained of in light of a potential lawsuit and take corrective
action.").
72. See Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1049 (Pa. 1997). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted, in total, ten sections of the ALI's Principles,
including § 7.04, which governs judicial review of an allegedly improper response by a board to a shareholder demand. With respect to the scope of review
of a decision by a board to reject a demand, the ALI's approach differs from that
of the ABA. Compare ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, § 7.04, with 2 MODEL
ACT, supra note 67, § 7.43. Various commentators have endorsed each approach. Compare Dennis J. Block et al., Derivative Litigation: Current Law
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the consistently reliable scholarship reflected in the work of
the ALI.73 The court observed that the ALI's Principles furthered the policies inherent in the business judgment rule
and provided an appropriate degree of specificity to guide
trial courts.74
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the ALI demand rule under its authority to adopt rules governing the
filing of litigation, including derivative litigation, in Pennsylvania courts.75 California courts similarly have the inherent
authority to adopt the ALI's proposed demand rule as the law
of California, just as they have the authority to adopt a proposed rule set forth in, for example, the ALI's Restatement of
Torts. The ALI commentary indicates that Section 7.03 "is
intended to express a preferred rule of state law" and that it
"can be implemented by judicial decision.,

76

Because Califor-

nia law currently fails to define specific standards for when to
excuse demand,77 the courts must fill that gap.
The "clear trend of recent decisions has been toward re-

Versus the American Law Institute, 48 Bus. LAW. 1443, 1482 (1993) (criticizing
the ALI's approach as engendering excessive judicial scrutiny of post-demand
business judgments, and approving the ABA rules), with Douglas M. Branson,
Recent Changes to the Model Business CorporationsAct: Death Knells for Main
Street CorporationLaw, 72 NEB. L. REV. 258, 276-77 (1993) (criticizing the
ABA's approach as overly deferential to the board's response to a demand, and
endorsing the ALI's rules). The issue of what is the appropriate scope of review
of a board's decision to refuse a demand is beyond the scope of this article.
73. See Cuker, 692 A.2d at 1049.
74. See id. at 1048-49.
75. The language of the Pennsylvania statute describing the demand requirement, which provides the statutory context in which the Cuker court announced its adoption of the ALI's universal demand rule, is virtually identical to
California's statute. Compare PA. R. CIV. P. 1506(a) (1998) ("[A derivative complaint] shall set forth ... the efforts made to secure enforcement by the corporation or similar entity [of its rights] or the reason for not making any such efforts.") (emphasis added), with CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b) (West 1990) ("[N]o
[derivative] action may be instituted ...

unless ...

plaintiff alleges in the com-

plaint with particularity plaintiffs efforts to secure from the board such action
as plaintiff desires or the reasonsfor not making such effort.") (emphasis added).
Neither statute specifies what "reasons" will be sufficient to excuse demand.
The decisional backdrop to the Cuker opinion was also similar to current California case law. Before Pennsylvania adopted the ALI approach, at least one
case decided under Pennsylvania law excused demand where the transaction
was alleged to have been fraudulent or infected by self-dealing. See Garber v.
Lego, 11 F.3d 1197, 1203 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1993); cf supra note 13 (discussing Koshaba, Reed, and Shields).
76. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, § 7.03 cmt. b, at 54.
77. See supra Part I.A.
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quiring pre-suit demand, even when earlier precedents might
have excused it."78 Commentators, even those critical of some
aspects of the derivative litigation rules proposed by the ALI
and the ABA, acknowledge the advantages of a universal demand approach."9 Since 1988, at least thirteen states have
statutorily adopted some form of a universal demand rule.8"
California should similarly follow the modern trend by
adopting the universal demand rule and reject Delaware's
cumbersome and costly test for excusing demand and.
IV. Two LESSER ALTERNATIVES: MODIFYING ARONSON AND
ASSURING THAT IT IS APPLIED PROPERLY

If the California courts fail to follow the modern trend
towards a universal demand model, they ought to at least reduce some of the undesirable effects of the Aronson rule. One
approach would be to modify the Aronson test by eliminating
its second prong (which permits allegations of breach of the
duty of care to excuse demand) and its reasonable doubt
standard.8 A second approach, if California courts are determined to adopt Delaware law part and parcel, would be to
make clear that California is adopting not only the Aronson
78. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, § 7.03 reporter's note 1, at 63.
79. Commentators representing a wide variety of perspectives have both
criticized and defended various aspects of both the ALI's and ABA's proposed
rules governing derivative litigation. These commentators have been almost
unanimous in their support of the element common to both proposals, the universal demand rule. See, e.g., Block et al., supra note 72 (approving the ABA's
universal demand approach, in light of the model act provisions on demandrefused analysis, and criticizing the ALI's post-demand approach as failing to
accord sufficient deference to business judgments regarding how to respond to a
demand); Dennis J. Block et al., The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in
ShareholderLitigation at the Turn of the Decade, 45 Bus. LAW., 469, 485 (1990)
("We agree with the drafters of the Model Business Corporation Act and [Tentative Drafts 8 & 9 of the] Principles of Corporate Governance that there is much
to be said in favor of requiring a prelitigation demand on a universal basis ....); see also Branson, supra note 72, at 275 (approving the ALI's universal
demand proposal, in light of its provisions for substantive judicial review of the
board's response to demand, and criticizing the ABA's post-demand rules as
overly deferential to a board's refusal of a demand); Kinney, supra note 52, at
182-87 (criticizing the ALI approach as overly litigation-oriented and the ABA
approach as biased in favor of board decisions, but proposing universal demand
requirement for cases alleging a breach of the duty of care); Swanson, supra
note 46, at 1386-87 (offering criticism of the balances struck by the ALI and
ABA approaches, but strongly endorsing the universal demand rule).
80. See Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1038-39 (N.Y. 1996) (describing
the rules in those thirteen states).
81. See supra Part II.B.2.
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rule in toto, but also the Delaware case law that forms the
backdrop of the Aronson decision. That case law requires
that demand futility be pleaded "with particularity" and distinguishes gross negligence, which excuses demand, from
simple negligence, which does not. Although both alternatives offer fewer advantages than adopting the ALI/ABA rule,
they are presented as potential compromise positions that
would make California's demand rule more clear, simpler in
application, and more consistent with the functions and policy
underpinnings of the rule.
A. Modifying the Aronson Rule: Eliminatingthe Second
Prongand Eliminatingthe ReasonableDoubt Standard
If California courts are inclined to look to Delaware law
for a model, they should adopt only the first prong of the Aronson test. The first prong is more consistent with the modern trend in that it establishes a relatively bright line test (at
least when compared to the potentially expansive second
prong) that will diminish collateral litigation and provide less
opportunity for avoidance of the demand requirement.
To apply the first prong, a court need only determine
whether a complaint contains particularized allegations
showing that a majority of the directors had a personal financial interest in the underlying transaction, or were controlled
by someone who did.82 Either the complaint identifies a financial interest for each director or it does not. There is no
need to litigate the merits of the causes of action asserted in
the complaint, as required under the second prong, in order to
assess whether to excuse demand. There is also no need for
complex litigation in each case to determine where to draw
the line between simple and gross negligence.3 Thus, declining to import the second prong of Aronson into California
law will make the test for excusing demand less costly and
easier to administer.
Moreover, the first prong approximates much more
closely than the second what little law there is in California
82. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984).
83. The rule proposed here is the formulation of the first prong of the Aronson test as set forth more recently by the Delaware Supreme Court in Levine v.
Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 205 (Del. 1991), which appears to have eliminated the
problematic "reasonable doubt" standard from the first prong of the Aronson
test. See supra text accompanying note 45.
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on excusing demand.8 4 The Shields case, in refusing to excuse
demand, observed that the plaintiff failed to plead with particularity that the board engaged in a fraud or conspiracy,
benefited from the transaction, or was unable to exercise independent judgment.8" The common thread among those
missing allegations is actual or implied intentional wrongdoing-that is, bad faith conduct on the part of the board.
Similarly, the first prong of Aronson identifies the cases that
demonstrate a likelihood of such intentional wrongdoing.
Alternatively, if California adopts both prongs of the Aronson test, the "reasonable doubt" standard should be eliminated. As described earlier, the "reasonable doubt" standard
contained in the second prong of the Aronson test (as modified
by Levine v. Smith") is excessively confusing, subjective, and
permissive.8 7 The standard unnecessarily diminishes the role
of the board in managing the litigation affairs of the corporation. Thus, if California courts adopt both prongs of Aronson
as the law of California, eliminating the problematic "reasonable doubt" standard from that test would add at least a degree of administrability and predictability to the demand futility determination. New York's high court recently adopted
this approach. In Marx v. Akers,88 the New York Court of Appeals, after reviewing the criticism of the reasonable doubt
standard, expressly refused to adopt that portion of the Delaware test.89 California courts should follow New York's lead
and reject the unwieldy and inherently subjective reasonable
doubt standard.
B.

ClarifyingHow the Aronson Rule Should Be Applied
1. The ParticularityStandard

If California adopts Delaware law in toto, then the lower
courts must be given guidance as to how the Aronson rule
should be applied. In addition to guidance on how to address
the problematic "reasonable doubt" standard, the trial courts
need clear standards in two important areas. First, the
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See supra note 13 (discussing Koshaba, Reed, and Shields).
See Shields v. Singleton, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459, 465 (Ct. App. 1993).
Levine, 591 A.2d at 205. See supra text accompanying note 45.
See supra Part II.B.2.d.
Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 1996).
See id. at 1039.
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courts must articulate the standard for pleading facts "with
particularity." Under Delaware case law, conclusory allegations cannot excuse demand: a plaintiff must plead "particularized facts" showing demand futility.9" The particularity requirement is an integral part of the Aronson test, as it seeks
to prevent the authority of the board to manage the affairs of
the corporation from being too easily nullified by individual
shareholders. Thus, if California adopts the Aronson test, the
courts must take note of, and strictly enforce, the specificity
requirement dictated by Aronson and its progeny."
2. DifferentiatingSimple from Gross Negligence
Similarly, to apply Aronson's second prong properly, California courts must also incorporate the surrounding Delaware
case law regarding what is and what is not gross negligence.
The Delaware courts recognized that Aronson's second prong
was intended to excuse demand only in very rare cases.
Thus, an expansive view of what allegations constitute gross
negligence can seriously undermine the balance that the
Delaware courts intended to strike. In order to preserve the
90. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814, 816-817 (Del. 1984) (where
plaintiffs allegation of control is "at best... a conclusion devoid of factual support," the court "cannot conclude that the complaint factually particularizes any
circumstances of control"); see also Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del.
1988) ("[C] onclusionary allegations of fact or law not supported by allegations of
specific fact may not be taken as true."). California law similarly refuses to
permit conclusory allegations to excuse demand. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(2)
(West 1990); see also Shields, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 466 ("[Blare allegations of director wrongdoing without factual support cannot excuse demand."); Fairchild
v. Bank of Am., 13 Cal. Rptr. 491, 494 (Ct. App. 1961) (where "[nlo sufficient
facts are alleged with particularity," a "conclusionary allegation" of demand futility does not meet the statutory pleading requirement).
91. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 817 (the "shorthand shibboleth" that the
directors were "dominated and controlled" is insufficient to excuse demand); see
also Cottle v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1094, 1100 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (applying Delaware law) (holding that a "conclusional" charge that directors "completed a transaction as an improper entrenchment device to ward off a takeover
attempt" is insufficient to excuse demand). To the extent the case law has not
sufficiently defined the quantum of particularity required to excuse demand, see
Coffee, supra note 25, at 1413, that fact only argues more forcefully in favor of
rejecting the Aronson test altogether. Assuming, though, that California courts
choose to adopt Aronson, they should adopt the surrounding Delaware case law
regarding particularity of pleadings to minimize the variances in results that
might otherwise be produced by application of the Aronson rule. See id. at
1412-13 & n. 22-26.
92. See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 190 (Del. 1988); In re Caremark Int'l
Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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authority and right of a board to manage the corporation's
litigation, California trial courts must understand the distinction between gross and simple negligence drawn under Delaware law. Failure to recognize this important distinction
would convert the Delaware demand futility rule into an extraordinarily permissive threshold, something that it was
never intended to be.
For example, in virtually every derivative case, a plaintiff
pleading with the advantage of hindsight will be able to allege that a board overlooked a particular fact in approving a
transaction. After all, derivative litigation results only when
a transaction has in some way gone sour. In such cases, particularly where a large or high-profile company is involved,
the media and securities analysts often publish post-mortems
Those post-mortems, in assessing
on those transactions.
what went wrong with a transaction, identify, in retrospect,
"red flags" that indicate the transaction was imprudent.
Thus, whenever a transaction goes bad, a shareholder can
meet a simple negligence standard by copying those
post-mortems into a complaint and alleging that the board
"overlooked" one or more "red flags."
But under Delaware precedents, it is clear that merely
overlooking certain facts, even material ones, constitutes only
simple negligence. What turns negligence into gross negligence is the absence of a meaningful investigative process.
The existence of even a minimal good faith investigative process precludes a finding of gross negligence.9 3 Indeed, a Delaware Chancery Court recently found that even a board overlooking a "smoking gun" is irrelevant to the gross negligence
analysis.9 4 As summarized by one commentator:
93. See Carlton Invs. v. TLC Beatrice Int'l Holdings, Inc., No. Civ. A. 13950,
1997 WL 38130, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1997) (noting, with respect to reasonableness of investigation, that "[w]hat is important ... is what the [board members] knew and did during the investigation" and not the existence of other information); accord Caremark Intl, 698 A.2d at 967 ("[C]ompliance with a
director's duty of care . .. [is] determined by ... the good faith or rationality of
the process employed.") (emphasis added); see Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l Inc.,
683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("[N]o risk [of liability] if they act in good
faith and meet minimal procedural standards of attention."); cf Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (directors were "grossly negligent in
approving the 'sale' of the company upon two hours' consideration, without prior
notice").
94. See Carlton Invs., No. Civ. A. 13950, Tr. of Scheduling Conf. at 56
(Del.Ch. Nov. 27, 1996) [hereinafter Carlton Invs. Tr.].
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The court noted that "to be reasonable in getting informed
doesn't mean to be perfectly informed. There is always
something more you could do to get better informed." Accordingly, the court held that it would only evaluate "what
the directors did based upon the reasonableness of their
own efforts to become informed, and then the rationality of
the judgment that they reached." The court went so far as
to state that, even if "there is a smoking gun out there,"
but, based upon the information reasonably gathered by
the committee, its judgment was still sound, the "smoking
gun" would be irrelevant to a determination of whether
the investigation was reasonable and whether the [board
members] reached reasonable conclusions.
The Delaware decisions clarify that the focus of the inquiry
should be on the existence of a good faith process, not on
whether the board overlooked one or more particular facts
during that process. 6
Delaware's high threshold for showing gross negligence
reflects the Delaware courts' policy that rules regarding the
duty of care should not unduly inhibit directors in making difficult or risky business decisions on behalf of the shareholders.97 For that reason, directors should rarely be found in
breach of the duty of care under Delaware law, and accordingly, demand should rarely be excused on that basis. As the
Delaware Supreme Court stated in Grobow v. Perot:
Approval of a transaction by a majority of independent,
disinterested directors almost always bolsters a presumption that the business judgment rule attaches to transactions approved by a board of directors that are later attacked on grounds of lack of due care. In such cases, a
95. Gregory V. Varallo, et al., From Kahn to Carlton: Recent Developments

in Special Committee Practice, 53 Bus. LAW. 397, 417 (1998) (citing Carlton
Invs. Tr., No. Civ. A. 13950, at 56).
96. See, e.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 214 (Del. 1991) ("[A] determina-

tion of what matters will (and will not) be considered must necessarily fall

within the board's discretion."); see also Ryan v. Aetna Life Ins., 765 F. Supp.
133, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying Delaware law) (holding that allegations that

the board's investment banker failed to investigate "the higher value that might

have been realized by alternative types of transactions" insufficient to plead

gross negligence); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. Civ. A.

10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *19 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) ("[Tlhe amount of infor-

mation that it is prudent to have before a decision is made is itself a business
judgment of the very type that courts are institutionally poorly equipped to
make.").
97. See CaremarkInt'l, 698 A.2d at 967.
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heavy burden falls on a plaintiff to avoid presuit demand.98

Excusing demand based on allegations that a board
overlooked certain material facts would collapse the gross
negligence standard into the simple negligence standard.
Further, such an expansive rule would render meaningless
the "heavy burden" that the Delaware Supreme Court intended to impose in duty of care cases. If a plaintiffs attorney need only plead allegations based on a few published,
hindsight analyses of a transaction that performed poorly,
demand will be excused in every case. Accordingly, if California adopts Delaware's demand rule, California courts
should strictly adhere to and articulate the Delaware case
law's distinction between gross negligence and simple negligence. Failure to do so will nullify the balance that Aronson
and subsequent Delaware decisions intended to strike.

98. Grobow, 539 A.2d at 190 (emphasis added). The Grobow decision does,
however, contain additional language that at least on its face appears inconsistent with the Delaware case law on gross negligence discussed above. This fact
is likely to generate some confusion in the California courts unless those courts
clearly articulate the distinction between simple and gross negligence under
Delaware law. The Grobow opinion states at one point that gross negligence
means "being uninformed in critical respects." Id. at 190. This language should
not be read to mean that overlooking one or more facts constitutes gross negligence in Delaware. In making that statement, Grobow cites Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), as its example, a case where there was a
complete absence of a good faith investigative process. See id. at 874 (summarizing lack of investigative process and concluding that directors "were grossly
negligent in approving the 'sale' of the Company upon two hours' consideration,
without prior notice"). Moreover, interpreting Grobow as defining gross negligence as something less than the absence of a good faith process would be inconsistent with the language in Grobow imposing a "heavy burden" on any
shareholder who seeks to have demand excused based on allegations of breach
of the duty of care. See Grobow, 539 A.2d at 190; see also Caremark Int'l, 698
A.2d at 967 ("The theory here advanced [the breach of the duty of care or attention] is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment."). It would also be inconsistent with the
manner in which gross negligence has been defimed by the Delaware Chancery
courts in the last decade and with the absence of any case in Delaware where
demand has been excused because a board, in approving a transaction, had
simply overlooked one or more facts. Finally, it would be inconsistent with the
language in "Grobow II," where the Delaware Supreme Court described a
breach of the duty of care as "acting in an uninformed manner," thus placing the
focus on the process employed by the board. Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207
(Del. 1991) (emphasis added) (arising out of the amended complaint filed in
Grobow after the Delaware Supreme Court's 1988 Grobow decision).
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CONCLUSION

As derivative actions are brought with increasing frequency in California courts against California corporations,
California must adopt a clear rule specifying the circumstances under which a shareholder-plaintiff will be excused
from making a demand on the board to pursue litigation on
behalf of the corporation. California's rule should be consistent with the important policies the demand requirement intended to achieve. The Delaware rule of demand futility is
inconsistent with those policies. This article proposes three
alternatives from which California courts may choose. Primarily, this article advocates that the California courts
should adopt the proposed ALI/ABA rule, which will eliminate substantial litigation costs and better effectuate corporate governance policies underlying the demand requirement.
Alternatively, the California courts should modify the Delaware test to eliminate its reasonable doubt standard and to
render allegations of a breach of the duty of care by a board
insufficient to excuse demand. Finally, at the very least, if
the California courts choose to adopt the Delaware demand
rule, they should also adopt Delaware's requirement that demand futility be pleaded with particularity, and Delaware's
distinction between gross negligence and simple negligence.

